Coup-Proofing via Capital Relocation

PPOL 6805 / DSAN 6750: GIS for Spatial Data Science

Author
Affiliation

Jeff Jacobs

Georgetown University

Other Formats

Introduction

Several previous studies have found robust relationships between spatial properties of a country’s capital city and that country’s propensity for ethnic and political conflict and “instability”.

Perceptions of this linkage also have an effect on “coup-proofing” decisions made by national governments. A recent BBC interview with Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang, for example, highlighted this as a factor behind his decision to relocate the capital city:

It’s the remoteness of Oyala that makes it so appealing to President Obiang. In a rare interview he described how rebels had recently plotted a seaborne assault on his palace in the current capital, Malabo. ‘We need a secure place for my government and for future governments. That’s why we have created Oyala, to guarantee the government of Equatorial Guinea.’ (Sackur 2012)

This case is far from exceptional, as an even more recent Washington Post article points out with respect to Myanmar’s decision to move its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw:

Analysts have described the decision as motivated by a desire to secure the military’s seat of power from any threat of protests or invasions. (Berger 2021)

Most of these studies, however, are based on observations of conflict events. In this study, we study the more fundamental variable of a capital’s distance from the population centroid of the country.

Literature Review

Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2019) analyzes the relationship between the distance to a capital city and the appearance of conflict in a given country. Their two key findings are that:

Conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital

and

Isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance.

This first finding is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The “core” finding in Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2019), where the probability of conflict decreases with distance from a national capital, and where this effect is greater for less-dense states.

Within the political economy literature, a series of studies starting with Nunn and Puga (2012) have shown how the effects of geospatial features like “terrain ruggedness” can differ wildly (e.g., can flip signs) between African and non-African states due to the history of slave-raiding and its effect on societal levels of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Herbst (2000) thus “zooms in” specifically on the effect of capital-to-population distance on political instability within Sub-Saharan Africa.

This historically-informed focus on postcolonial state-building provides a more nuanced view, wherein the single independent variable (distance to national capital) used in studies like Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2019) is disaggregated into something like “distribution of major population centers relative to national capital”.

This disaggregation, in turn, allows first-order and second-order GIS measures to be used to define and test hypotheses about the relationship between geography and political instability. First, “population centers” are defined based on first-order population intensity functions: subregions whose mean population intensity is above a certain threshold are interpreted as potentially “rebellious” population centers, over which that the central government in the capital aims to maximize control1. The difficulty of exerting this control is then defined based on a second-order pairwise correlation functions, where greater average distances between pairs of population centers are hypothesized to cause greater instability.

As shown in Figure 2, for example, Herbst (2000) classifies the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a state with “difficult” population density based on these criteria, since the capital and largest city (Kinshasa) in the far west of the country is extremely distant from the next two largest cities (Mbuji-Mayi near the direct center and Lubumbashi in the far southeast). In contrast, Benin’s population density is classified as “favorable”, as density decreases with almost perfect exponential decay per increase in distance from the capital (Porto-Novo) and largest city (Cotonou), both in the far south of the country.

Figure 2: Example countries with population distributions classified as “favorable” (with respect to centralized state power and stability) in Herbst (2000)
Figure 3: Example countries with population distributions classified as “difficult” (with respect to centralized state power and stability) in Herbst (2000)

Methodology

The population centroids we use herein might require some explanation, since the term “centroid” can be ambiguous. Here, we draw on the population centroid definition (along with the data) used in Hall et al. (2019).

Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)

Here we plot the base GIS objects we’re analyzing: the location of each capital city (in purple) and each population centroid (in yellow).

Source: Article Notebook

We then construct an area-normalized measure of capital-centroid distance \(\text{dist}^{\textsf{AN}}\), using the formula

\[ \text{dist}^{\textsf{AN}}_i = \text{dist}_i / \sqrt{\text{area}_i}. \]

A plot of this measure by country looks as follows:

If the data was too big for mapview, the following is the same map hosted on ArcGIS and embedded here:

Hypothesis Testing (Regression)

geounit iso_a3 OBJECTID ID_0 NAME_ENGLI OUT_FLAG NAME dist area scaled_dist total_score geometry centroid capital
Tanzania TZA 227 227 Tanzania 0 Dar es Salaam 324758.1 [m] 885800 345.0580 [m] 0.007 MULTIPOLYGON (((33.90371 -0… POINT (36.5813 -5.612844) POINT (39.2664 -6.798067)
Canada CAN 42 42 Canada 0 Ottawa 1410811.7 [m] 8788700 475.8902 [m] 0.001 MULTIPOLYGON (((-122.84 49,… POINT (-92.673 51.33108) POINT (-75.70196 45.41864)
United States of America USA 244 244 United States 0 Washington, D.C. 1227411.4 [m] 9147420 405.8269 [m] 0.022 MULTIPOLYGON (((-122.84 49,… POINT (-91.24719 39.43566) POINT (-77.01136 38.9015)
Kazakhstan KAZ 117 117 Kazakhstan 0 Nur-Sultan 227074.6 [m] 2699700 138.2009 [m] 0.010 MULTIPOLYGON (((87.35997 49… POINT (69.7252 49.45229) POINT (71.42777 51.18113)
Uzbekistan UZB 246 246 Uzbekistan 0 Tashkent 168011.1 [m] 440653 253.0985 [m] 0.005 MULTIPOLYGON (((55.96819 41… POINT (67.77264 40.30358) POINT (69.26882 41.30383)
Papua New Guinea PNG 175 175 Papua New Guinea 0 Port Moresby 289887.1 [m] 452860 430.7714 [m] 0.025 MULTIPOLYGON (((141.0002 -2… POINT (146.2921 -7.014699) POINT (147.1925 -9.464708)

Discussion

Conclusion

Our evidence indicates that the spatial dynamics of conflict differ from the spatial dynamics of misgovernance.

References

Berger, Miriam. 2021. “Myanmar’s Military Built a New Capital as a Haven for Power. Other Countries Have Tried That, Too.” Washington Post, February 6, 2021.
Campante, Filipe R., Quoc-Anh Do, and Bernardo Guimaraes. 2019. “Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 11 (3): 298–337.
Hall, Ola, Maria Francisca Archila Bustos, Niklas Boke Olén, and Thomas Niedomysl. 2019. “Population Centroids of the World Administrative Units from Nighttime Lights 1992-2013.” Scientific Data 6 (1): 235.
Herbst, Jeffrey. 2000. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control - Second Edition. Princeton University Press.
Nunn, Nathan, and Diego Puga. 2012. “Ruggedness: The Blessing of Bad Geography in Africa.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (1): 20–36.
Nunn, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. “The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa.” American Economic Review 101 (7): 3221–52.
Sackur, Stephen. 2012. “Equatorial Guinea: Obiang’s Future Capital, Oyala.” BBC News: Magazine, December 14, 2012.
Weber, Max. 1919. The Vocation Lectures. Hackett Publishing.

Footnotes

  1. Sociologically, Herbst (2000) thus follows the “Weberian” definition of the state, as the entity possessing a monopoly over the legally-legitimized use of violence over a certain territory (Weber 1919).↩︎