Introduction
Several previous studies have found robust relationships between spatial properties of a country’s capital city and that country’s propensity for ethnic and political conflict and “instability”.
Perceptions of this linkage also have an effect on “coup-proofing” decisions made by national governments. A recent BBC interview with Equatorial Guinea’s President Teodoro Obiang, for example, highlighted this as a factor behind his decision to relocate the capital city:
It’s the remoteness of Oyala that makes it so appealing to President Obiang. In a rare interview he described how rebels had recently plotted a seaborne assault on his palace in the current capital, Malabo. ‘We need a secure place for my government and for future governments. That’s why we have created Oyala, to guarantee the government of Equatorial Guinea.’ (Sackur 2012)
This case is far from exceptional, as an even more recent Washington Post article points out with respect to Myanmar’s decision to move its capital from Yangon to Naypyidaw:
Analysts have described the decision as motivated by a desire to secure the military’s seat of power from any threat of protests or invasions. (Berger 2021)
Most of these studies, however, are based on observations of conflict events. In this study, we study the more fundamental variable of a capital’s distance from the population centroid of the country.
Literature Review
Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2019) analyzes the relationship between the distance to a capital city and the appearance of conflict in a given country. Their two key findings are that:
Conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital
and
Isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance.
This first finding is illustrated in Figure 1.
Within the political economy literature, a series of studies starting with Nunn and Puga (2012) have shown how the effects of geospatial features like “terrain ruggedness” can differ wildly (e.g., can flip signs) between African and non-African states due to the history of slave-raiding and its effect on societal levels of trust (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). Herbst (2000) thus “zooms in” specifically on the effect of capital-to-population distance on political instability within Sub-Saharan Africa.
This historically-informed focus on postcolonial state-building provides a more nuanced view, wherein the single independent variable (distance to national capital) used in studies like Campante, Do, and Guimaraes (2019) is disaggregated into something like “distribution of major population centers relative to national capital”.
This disaggregation, in turn, allows first-order and second-order GIS measures to be used to define and test hypotheses about the relationship between geography and political instability. First, “population centers” are defined based on first-order population intensity functions: subregions whose mean population intensity is above a certain threshold are interpreted as potentially “rebellious” population centers, over which that the central government in the capital aims to maximize control1. The difficulty of exerting this control is then defined based on a second-order pairwise correlation functions, where greater average distances between pairs of population centers are hypothesized to cause greater instability.
As shown in Figure 2, for example, Herbst (2000) classifies the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a state with “difficult” population density based on these criteria, since the capital and largest city (Kinshasa) in the far west of the country is extremely distant from the next two largest cities (Mbuji-Mayi near the direct center and Lubumbashi in the far southeast). In contrast, Benin’s population density is classified as “favorable”, as density decreases with almost perfect exponential decay per increase in distance from the capital (Porto-Novo) and largest city (Cotonou), both in the far south of the country.
Methodology
The population centroids we use herein might require some explanation, since the term “centroid” can be ambiguous. Here, we draw on the population centroid definition (along with the data) used in Hall et al. (2019).
Exploratory Data Analysis (EDA)
Here we plot the base GIS objects we’re analyzing: the location of each capital city (in purple) and each population centroid (in yellow).
We then construct an area-normalized measure of capital-centroid distance \(\text{dist}^{\textsf{AN}}\), using the formula
\[ \text{dist}^{\textsf{AN}}_i = \text{dist}_i / \sqrt{\text{area}_i}. \]
A plot of this measure by country looks as follows:
If the data was too big for mapview, the following is the same map hosted on ArcGIS and embedded here:
Hypothesis Testing (Regression)
| geounit | iso_a3 | OBJECTID | ID_0 | NAME_ENGLI | OUT_FLAG | NAME | dist | area | scaled_dist | total_score | geometry | centroid | capital |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tanzania | TZA | 227 | 227 | Tanzania | 0 | Dar es Salaam | 324758.1 [m] | 885800 | 345.0580 [m] | 0.007 | MULTIPOLYGON (((33.90371 -0… | POINT (36.5813 -5.612844) | POINT (39.2664 -6.798067) |
| Canada | CAN | 42 | 42 | Canada | 0 | Ottawa | 1410811.7 [m] | 8788700 | 475.8902 [m] | 0.001 | MULTIPOLYGON (((-122.84 49,… | POINT (-92.673 51.33108) | POINT (-75.70196 45.41864) |
| United States of America | USA | 244 | 244 | United States | 0 | Washington, D.C. | 1227411.4 [m] | 9147420 | 405.8269 [m] | 0.022 | MULTIPOLYGON (((-122.84 49,… | POINT (-91.24719 39.43566) | POINT (-77.01136 38.9015) |
| Kazakhstan | KAZ | 117 | 117 | Kazakhstan | 0 | Nur-Sultan | 227074.6 [m] | 2699700 | 138.2009 [m] | 0.010 | MULTIPOLYGON (((87.35997 49… | POINT (69.7252 49.45229) | POINT (71.42777 51.18113) |
| Uzbekistan | UZB | 246 | 246 | Uzbekistan | 0 | Tashkent | 168011.1 [m] | 440653 | 253.0985 [m] | 0.005 | MULTIPOLYGON (((55.96819 41… | POINT (67.77264 40.30358) | POINT (69.26882 41.30383) |
| Papua New Guinea | PNG | 175 | 175 | Papua New Guinea | 0 | Port Moresby | 289887.1 [m] | 452860 | 430.7714 [m] | 0.025 | MULTIPOLYGON (((141.0002 -2… | POINT (146.2921 -7.014699) | POINT (147.1925 -9.464708) |
Discussion
Conclusion
Our evidence indicates that the spatial dynamics of conflict differ from the spatial dynamics of misgovernance.
References
Footnotes
Sociologically, Herbst (2000) thus follows the “Weberian” definition of the state, as the entity possessing a monopoly over the legally-legitimized use of violence over a certain territory (Weber 1919).↩︎
